Abstract-With the rapid development of network applications, the issues of Network transmission security become very important. Therefore, SSL protocol is more and more widely used in a variety of network services. But the SSL protocol itself is not perfect, in practice, there are also problems. For the deficiencies of endpoint authentication in the SSL handshake process, the paper analyzes two kinds of defects existing in the SSL hand-shake process. Firstly, handshake process, in the first stage of the SSL connection, using plaintexts, existing the possibility of being monitored and tampered. Secondly, SSL deployment of the actual application. Because of considering the factors about the performance of the network connection, that usually uses the way of switch connection based on HTTP protocol. In response to these deficiencies, this thesis adopts the two ways of forged certificates and converting the data stream from HTTPS to HTTP to attack them. In addition, a new attack mode against the data stream of HTTPS is designed and implemented. Experiments show that the above three methods cause significant security risks to HTTPS communications. Therefore, taking a static ARP table, enhanced certificate mechanism and mutual authentication of three different measures are proposed to enhance network security in the paper. It is shown that three ways can relative effectively defense against attacks on HTTPS in the experiments.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of e-commerce and cloud computing, SSL protocol is more and more widely used in all kinds of network services. SSL protocol by providing end to end authentication, message encryption, message integrity check and other security mechanisms protects the security of the communication process. For example, Yahoo ensures the security of the mail account through SSL, to protect the safety of the user e-mail account. Amazon shields the user transaction account and transaction security by it. In recent years, due to the development of cloud computing, the connection security between the client and the cloud is also an extremely important issue. December 2009, VeriSign announced, VeriSign will provide security and authentication services cloud-based computing for Microsoft Windows Azure platform. And Microsoft will use VeriSign SSL Certificate and VeriSign code signing certificate, to ensure the security of the cloud-based computing services and applications that being developed and deployed on the Windows Azure platform. Because, in the using of cloud computing model, the users` all computing resources are stored in the cloud, so network connection is essential for you to normally work. Therefore, if the server ends were safe enough, the security of network transmission would become very important. The SSL protocol is widely embedded in the client browser currently, the server-side also is relatively easy to deploy and implement, and the SSL protocol itself has good security features. At present, most bases of the cloud security applications are using the SSL protocol, many current hacker communities study SSL, so that the security issues of the SSL protocol are more and more concerned.
But SSL is not perfect in the practical application, there still exists the possibility of middle attack. 2003, in the literature [1] , Peter Burkholder studied the defects of SSL handshake and verified the possibility of SSL attack, using the way of hijacked session of the typical middle attack to deceive the client to achieve the attack. In the year of 2009, Michael Howard, in the paper [2] , showed to carry out SSL attacks by the use of tools based on the Webmitm, which is a tool for SSL attack, and eventually received the data after decryption. The paper [3] shows, in the International security conference in 2009, Moxie brought forward that the HTTPS to the HTTP transfer connections in the practical application would have security problems, causing link substitution attack, but also the client has not traditional security warning signal, so there is a serious hazard. In the literature [4] , basing on the analysis of SSL attacks, put forth to improve the way of the browser interaction design to help users find the presence of attack, thereby enhancing safety. In the paper [5] ,according to the feature about SSL attacks often based on LAN-deceived, proposed ARP deception defense tool designed by their own to enhance LAN security, this is also obtained better results by the comparing experimental. However, there is a problem that this method is not for the SSL protocol itself. In the paper [6] being similar to [4] , improved the security of the parties through upgrading the browser interaction interface. This paper is on the basis of analyzing the defects of the SSL handshake, mainly do the following work:
First of all, the attack experiments were carried out in three ways. The first method is by use of the characteristics of plaintext in the handshake phase and the defects of client certificating authentication, hijacks sessions through ARP deception and DNS spoofing within the LAN, then the attacker fakes server-side certificate by a proxy way to attack, he can decrypt all the https data stream. The second one is that using the deployment defects of SSL in practical application, after by ARP tricked, forwarding all client traffic, and then monitoring HTTP messages, through altering the https address in return HTTP packets so as to achieve that the client is still working on the http connection, and the attacker maintains https connection with the remote server. An attacker sends directly plaintexts to the client in the way of http by decrypting encrypted data, so he can access all communication data. The last one, SSL intercepted procedures working on the embedded device are designed and implemented, the device is accessed the network in the series way, processing the passing SSL traffic, which mainly achieved to tamper the certificate. Because it uses the defects of the client certificate authentication, so once the client completes the recognition of the certificate, the equipment can also complete the decryption of the passing SSL data.
In the experiments, it was analyzed and compared to the specific course, dangers, feasibility of the several attack methods above, and carried out the corresponding packet user testing, so as to get the probability of success of various attack methods.
What`s more, based on the analysis on the attack, it was put forward to three kinds of defensive methods. They were static ARP table, EVSSL certificate and twoway certificate authentication, and analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of various defense methods. The results showed that, EVSSL was a more effectively preventing SSL attack way in practical applications.
II. HTTPS HANDSHAKE AND DRAWBACKS

A. Basic SSL Handshake
The first version of SSL Protocol is SSL3.0, because the wide range of applications, it is included in the Internet standards by the IETF, and it becomes the TLS. Currently, the version of SSL protocol widely used is TLS (SSL3.1), SSL handshake process is clearly defined in RFC2246 [7] , as is shown in the Fig. 1 above. 1) Client sends ClientHello: The client initiates SSL request message at first to show the beginning of an SSL handshake by sending ClientHello message. ClientHello packet includes the packet length, SSL version, a random number generated by the customer's key, sessionID, all the cryptographic suite which the client browser can support, compression method which may be adopted.
2) Server sends ServerHello: The server receives the ClientHello message sent by the client, then returns the ServerHello to the client basing on the message, which includes SSL version, the SSL version the server can highestly support, the random number key generated by the server, sessionID set by server, the communication encryption package which is selected from all encryption package of ClientHello by server, compression method which may be adopted.
3) Server sends its certificate: The server sends its own Authentication certificate chain, which probably includes server itself and the higher certificate. The certificate includes its version, serial number, signature algorithm, the information of the certificate issuer, effective time, information of the certificate's subject, the public key, extended domain, the signed value of the all certificate.
4) Server sends ServerHelloDone: The server shows that its all authentication informations have been sent to the client completely.
5) Client sends ClientKeyExchange: After the client passes the authentication of the certificate that is received from the server, the client will generate a pre-master key, and makes use of the server certificate's public key to encrypt the pre-master key, then the encrypted pre-master will be sent to the server in the form of client key exchange packets. 6) Client sends ChangeCipherSpec: The client shows that the next communication packets will be encrypted by the consultative suite of encryption key, and the client generates the master key used in this communication through the pre-master key and the information exchanged previously. 7) Client sends Finished: handshake finish message. The client show that the finished message in handshake phase, the main contents of which are the hash value of all previous the handshake messages and are sent after encrypted through the communications master key generated by (6).
8) Server sends ChangeCipherSpec: The server shows that the next communication message will be encrypted through the negotiation key suite. The server generates the master key of this communication through pre-master key and the previous exchanged information. 9 ) Server sends Finished: The server shows that the finished message in handshake phase, the main contents of which are the hash value of all the previous handshake messages(including the clients' finished message),and are sent after encrypted through the master key of communication generate by (7). After these steps, the communication messages of the two sides are both encrypted by means of the consultation symmetric key, therefore, all subsequent data streams are ciphertext flow, so that this ensures the security of communications content.
B. Anlyasis of the drawbacks 1) Certificate authantication
The data content is plaintext in SSL handshake, so attacker can obtain data packet by monitoring and tampering to it. It makes the hijacking attack to SSL session possible. Client authenticates the server by step 3 which transfers server certificate, but the certificate is transmitted in plaintext which can easily be intercepted and tampered. When the attacker intercepts and obtains the server certificate, it can forge its own fake certificate, and then fill the information with server's, inserting its own public key into certificate, signature and send the forged certificate. Once users accept the fake certificate, it means that the attack is successful. The attacker can decrypt the premaster key that client sends, there is no secret to attacker. Therefore, steps 3 has defect in the SSL handshake.
2) HTTPS connection initiates by HTTP According to analysis of users' habits and the practical applications of HTTPS, HTTPS request will be initiated by the following two ways: a) Users' habits When user accesses HTTPS sites by web browser, it usually types directly the URL without https head in the address bar, such as: www.xxx.com. If there is no protocol head in URL, the browser will use the HTTP protocol to connect the site. When client initiates HTTP connections, but the server is the HTTPS site, it will return messages of HTTP redirection. The content in this packet contains the actual HTTPS address, such as https://www.xxx.com. The client receives this packet, and browser will be relaunched to initiate HTTPS connection. Compared with directly typing https://www.xxx.com in client browser, this redirection will be no difference. b) Application in practice With HTTP connection, there are some buttons on the page to initiate HTTPS connections. For example, when you want log in personal account of E-mail, you will click on the submit button to transmit your ID and password. When you click on the button, the client initiates HTTPS connections to protect confidentiality of personal information.
Case a) is because of the habits of users, they don't pay attention to the difference between http and https in the URL. Case b) is because of consideration of the overhead of SSL handshake, only the important information has encrypted, not the whole data in the connection. In general, websites don't use HTTPS connection in the whole process, because HTTPS connection is usually 2 to 100 times slower than HTTP connection [8] . Therefore, the submission of confidential information (such as ID, password) is by HTTPS connection, and other services are still by HTTP connection. In this way, the delivery of HTTPS URL is in the HTTP message content, while the inherent insecurity of HTTP protocol, so it results in security vulnerabilities.
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF ATTACK AND RESULT
A. Implementation of attack 1) Implementation of the first method
Because of data transmission in plaintext in SSL handshake, the attacker can forward data by ARP Spoofing between the client and server. The attacker intercepts HTTPS requests of client, and connects with the server itself. When the server sends the certificate for authentication, the attacker can forge certificate which is a self-signed, and then sends it to the client. Users tend to choose to accept the forged certificate, so that the attacker has successfully set up SSL communication link. The attack has following steps: a) Conducting ARP Spoofing, it can make the attacker between the server and client. Then it can forward packets between the server and client.
b) Carrying out DNS Spoofing, and listening to the port 443. After that, the attacker can easily establish connection with the client.
When receiving the SSL request from the client, the attacker accepts the TCP request and initiates SSL handshake with the server. c) After successful connecting with the server, the attacker forges its self-signed certificate, replacing the public key with its own. And then accepting the client's SSL request, the fake certificate has sent to the client.
d) When the client receives the fake certificate, the browser will have an alert dialog which tells the user that the certificate is suspicious. Most users tend to accept the certificate, and it means the attack is successful. The client and attacker have established SSL connection.
e) Because of successful connecting with the client and the server respectively, the attacker can receive encrypted data from one part, decrypt it by the key of one part, encrypt it with the key of the other part, and send to the other. Hence, all the data between the client and the server is hijacked by attacker.
2) Implementation of the second method Similarly, the attacker can forward data and monitor the HTTP packet by ARP Spoofing between the client and the server. When the packet content sent from the server have HTTPS address for redirection, the attacker tampers the content, and sends to the client. At the same time, the attacker initiates HTTPS handshake with the server. If the attacker receives the HTTP request from the client which receives the tampered content, it decrypts the data in the ciphertext receiving from the server, and sends it to the client. Because of HTTP connection between the client and attacker, there is no alert dialog in the browser of the client. So this method is better deceptive. As the Fig. 2  and 3 below shows, and the attack has following steps: Figure 2 . Attacker listen to the connection. a) Conducting ARP Spoofing, it can make the attacker between the server and client. Then it can forward packets between the server and client.
b) The attacker monitors the HTTP data between the server and client.
c) When the attacker receives the data content from the server has <a href="https://...">, replacing it with <a href="http://...">. If the head of HTTP packet has "location:https://…", replacing it with "location:http://…", making a record about the addresses which have been tampered before.
d) If the attacker receives the HTTP request to the address which is in the record, it connects with the server by HTTPS. e) After establishing the HTTP connection with the client, the attacker decrypts the ciphertext of HTTP from the server, and sends the plaintext of HTTP to the client. In the browser of the client, there is no difference with the normal HTTPS connection, except the URL. In normal way, the URL begins with https. But after attacking, it begins with http.
3) Experimental result
Experiments are conducted in the 100M Ethernet, and the browser of the client is IE 6.0. The client machine runs on the windows xp, whose IP address is 192.168.1.2. The attacking machine runs on the Linux whose kernel is 2.6.11, and IP address is 192.168.1.3.
a) The result of first method A program is designed to carry out ARP Spoofing and DNS Spoofing. With the OpenSSL library, two modules are designed to tamper certificate and forward SSL data. The result is below:
In the browser of the client, this alert dialog will appear, the Fig. 4 above showing. If clicking on the yes, then the attack is successful. We can obtain all the information in the communication between the client and server.
b) The result of second method The same program with that above is used to carry out ARP Spoofing and DNS Spoofing. With the OpenSSL library and sslstrip of Moixe [9] , the attack is designed and verified. The result is shown in the Fig. 5 and 6 below:
There are two distinct differences between two pictures. The one is that normal URL begins with https, but after attacking it is http; the other one is that normal connection will have a lock icon under the browser, but after attacking there is not.
B. Implementation of the thrid attack
The principle of this attack is similar to the first attack method, they is by means of defects of a Certificate of the SSL handshake. Method 1 is only used in the same LAN with only one switch connected, or ARP deception can not be implemented, so the data stream of the client can not be forwarded. An experiment is designed to run SSL attack program on the embedded ARM development board, which has two Ethernet interfaces, being cascaded in the network, and does not be configured IP address in running, so that this does not change the local network topology. This board has two Ethernet interfaces eth0 and eth1, the role of the basic forwarding procedure is as follows: the eth0 receives datagrams with no treatment, sending directly them from the eth1. The eth1 receives datagrams in the same way, sending directly them from eth0. When this basic forward program runs on the equipment, then this can achieve the function of forwarding completely. The device itself has not IP address, when being accessed networks, it will not affect the topology. The specific topology is shown by Fig. 7 below. As is shown above, the device is cascaded with the exit of the router, so you can forward all the datagrams of the network.
In the process of forwarding the program, judge whether the datagrams are the SSL packets, if so then further processing, or transmitting directly. Take the connection of HTTPS for example below, HTTPS port number is 443, so the forwarding program can determine whether those are the HTTPS packets only by the 443 port.
When the HTTPS datagrams are received, it can be determined whether that are SSL handshake or SSL data messages, basing on the value of the SSL header fields. Here, the program only deals with the tampering of the SSL messages in the handshake phase.
According to the analysis of the principle of the SSL handshake certification, the process in a single handle HTTPS session is as follows:
1. Clienthello messages, record the random number, sessionID.
2. Serverhello messages, record the random number, sessionID and key package.
3. Certificate messages, tamper the last one of the issuer of the certificate messages to the '/ 0', and generate a pair of public and private key, use the generated public key to replace the public key of the certificate, and use the public key to sign for the whole certificate.
4. Client key exchange messages, decrypt messages by the generated private key, receive negotiation pre-master key, then the generated public key is used to encrypt.
5. Client finish messages, because of getting the premaster key, it can generate the primary communication key by means of previously recorded information and the pre-master key. Decrypt the finish messages by the master key, generate the value of the hash by means of the actual communication packets having been tampered, and then the master key is used to encrypt.
6. Server finish messages, as is shown in the 5 above, the hash of the server finish messages is generated, as according to the stipulated rules of the agreement, but its generation need to the record information after distorted, and the client finish messages having been generated together, then encrypt by the master key.
The communication after the treatment above, because of the certificate information being tampered, the client will also have the warning dialog of the certificate authentication. Once the user confirms the authentication to the certificate, it is normal connection between the server-side program and the client browser, and the data can be transmitted by that. We use the generated master key to identify the SSL data messages transfered, and then obtain the content of the plaintext by decrypting. a) The results of the third method are as follows:
The forward procedure is designed by the libpcap and libnet library. Because there are not only the functions relating to SSL in the OpenSSL library, but there also are a large number of cryptography API, with their help, you can easily implement encryption, decryption and the operation of hash calculation. And so we use the OpenSSL library to implement the processing procedures of the SSL packets.
The experimental platform is the development board with the Intel ixp435 network processor, which has four LAN interfaces, and a WAN port, only one LAN and a WAN port are used in the experiment. And Linux kernel version 2.6.16, the client environment is the same with the previous experiment.
The same structure with the above one is adopted in the experiment, the device is stringed to the local switch export.
The results are the same with the first method of attack, as the Fig. 8 shows below.
Similarly, the client browser will pop out the certificate warning dialog to prompt the authenticity of the client certificate. If the customer clicks "Yes", then the attack would be successful, and then all data packets of the communication can be gained by decryption.
b) Disscusion
Because the device itself, accessed in series in the network, will forward the data stream of all the machines coming from the LAN, then the operation load of the equipment may be very big, so the speed of the whole communication may be affected. Especially, in the case of a large number of hosts in the LAN, this phenomenon may be more significant. Moreover, the forward program designed by the libcap and libnet library, as it mainly working in the user layer, so that will also have a greater impact on the performance. 
C. Analysis and comparison about three methods
1) T he preparetion for attacks
The similarity between the first and second method is both of them must use the ARP Spoofing. The third method does not depend on it. With the development of Antivirus Software, many of them can detect the ARP Spoofing, and even some can deal with it in special method, except the third method.
2) Protocol with each side
In first method, the attacker establishes both SSL connections with the client and the server. In the second method, the attacker establishes SSL connection with the server but HTTP connection with the client. But in the third method, it doesn't establish connection with each side. The device just modifies the certificate and the handshake message for the following communication. The connection after attack is the same to the normal connection. The device just forwards the SSL encrypted data, if needing, it can decrypt the encrypted data.
3) Analysis of attack
The first and third method monitors the HTTPS request, after tampering the certificate, there is a dialog in the browser. If users accept the fake certificate, all the following are the same as the normal connection. On the contrary, the second one is different. It monitors the HTTP streams, and tampers redirection of https address. After attack, the browser of the client will have no alert, because it is actually a HTTP connection. Though it seems perfect, it has two distinct differences with the normal connection. One is the head of URL, and the other is the lock icon on the browser. If users are aware, the attack fails.
4) Harmfulness
In the first and third method, the success depends on the vigilance of the users. Only when the user clicks on the yes button, the attack can be successful. But in the second method, because of no alert dialog, users can't discern easily. Especially, a few of E-mail system only conduct HTTPS connection to send ID and password, after verifying them quickly redirect to the HTTP connection. In this case, it seems hardly note the existence of attack.
In the test experiment, 30 people through the client computer verify the harmfulness. The statistic data is shown in the TABLE I below:
Experimental results show that the number of the success of the second method is more than the first and third method, it is more harmful.
5) Difficulty
Method 1 and Method 2 can be completed by programming in the local machine, so the implementation does not require attached factors. But method 3 will need the programs to be run on the development board, the runtime library need to be migrated to the ixp435 platform, and it's relatively more complicated to implement. However, given the host owning the firewall with the ARP client protection function, so the third method will be completely free to consider the impact of such factors, but once the ARP deception fails, there is not only the warning of the ARP attack in the client, but also the user may sense to attack there. Then the software will prompt the user to take appropriate measures, such as prompting the user to use a static ARP table, and sometimes the first and second methods may also not succeed.
In the test experiment, 30 people use the client computer which has been installed special firewall that can defeat ARP Spoofing. The statistic data is shown in the TABLE II below.
Experimental results show that the success of the third method is more than the first and second method. Because the first and second method depend both on the ARP spoofing, so their results seem similar in this test.
IV. PROTECTION SCHEME
A. Static ARP
In the first and second method, at the beginning of attack, the need for ARP Spoofing is in order to deceive the client and the server for forwarding packets, so effectively preventing ARP deception is essential to prevent from HTTPS attacks. For most users, manually configuring a static ARP table is the most effective way [10] . Because IP address and MAC address in the static ARP table are fixed pairs, so it can prevent that fraud correspondence is added into the ARP table by ARP Spoofing. The experiment is conducted on a machine with windows xp sp3 configuring a static ARP table, the ARP deception fails. It means the static ARP table can effectively prevent the ARP cheating. But the disadvantage of this method is that it is not flexible to the large network, and changes need to be adjusted according to the topology. And the static ARP table can not work effectively in the third method.
B. EVSSL certificate
EVSSL certificate is a new stringent authentication standard of SSL certificate, which is the world's leading digital certificate authority and main browser developers to formulate. The browser can identify security EVSSL then display green in the address bar, so ordinary users can be confident that the visiting website is the entity that strictly authenticated by the authority. All digital certificate authority that issuing EVSSL certificate must follow the uniform criteria to carry out strict authentication, while the browser can identify EVSSL certificates makes the address bar turn green. For the first and third method of attack, browsers will have an alert dialog to tell the users; for the second method of attack, because the connection between the client and attacker is HTTP connection, the address bar will not turn green, it also can't check specific security information from the browser, so users can realize the connecting problems and conduct timely defense. Disadvantage of this approach is that only the newer versions of browsers can support EVSSL features, the general browser does not support it.
In addition, it depends on the user's own safety awareness whether the color of the address bar can be noted. Using two machines as the client machines, attacking in the second method, people involved in the experiment is divided into two groups, each group has 20 people. The client machine of first group is without the browser of EVSSL supported, and the second group uses the browser that supports EVSSL on the machine. The experimental results are in the figure 9 below. In comparison, it indicates that because of the EVSSL certificate, the success rate of attack decreases by 34%, effectively enhancing the security.
C. Two-way authentication
In RFC2246, a full SSL handshake includes not only the server authentication, but also the client authentication. But in applications, there is just server authentication, and the two-way authentication is conducted only when the server requires. This can not only speed up the network service, but also reduce the overhead. If the server is set to require authentication to client certificate, client must send an authorized certificate to the server. SSL connection can be successfully established after both sides are certified. In the first and second attack, because attacker can not obtain a legitimate certificate, so it is difficult to establish normal HTTPS connection with server. In the third attack, we can also design program to modify the client certificate. But the server will detect the fake certificate, so the connection will be terminated by the side of server.
In the local area network, we build a HTTPS site of self-configuration which requires client certificate, then attack in the second method. Experiment result show that attacker fails to establish HTTPS connection with the server. Disadvantages of this approach are that two-way certificate authentication requires the client having a legal certificate issued by the authority, the management of client certificate will be complicate. In addition, two-way authentication will have more encryption and decryption operations. The speed of connection will slow down and overhead of server will increase.
V. CONCLUSION
Experiments show that three methods of attack on the HTTPS session are feasible. In normal, connection speed of HTTPS services is 2-100 times slower than normal HTTP connection, users will not be aware of attacks even if the delay caused by the change of link. Because users usually don't care about the alert in the browser, when attacking in the first and third method, the majority of users will tend to accept a warning certificate even if the alert dialog; when attacking in second method, the user will not be aware because the little difference between the normal and attacking pages. In our experiment, using EVSSL certificate and two-way authentication are both effectively to avoid the attack. Configuring a static ARP table can avoid attack in first and second method How prevent man-in-the-middle attacks on HTTPS session more effective is the next focus of our study. 
